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Balancing Privacy Interests and Investigatory Interests
Legislative Analysis: House Bill 147, Daniel Zolnikov, R (HD 45)
Hannah Wilson
BILL FOR AN ACT ENTITLED: "AN ACT PROVIDING THAT A
SEARCH WARRANT IS REQUIRED FOR A GOVERNMENT
ENTITY TO ACCESS ANY ELECTRONIC DEVICE UNLESS
INFORMED CONSENT IS OBTAINED OR A JUDICIALLY
RECOGNIZED EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
EXISTS; PROVIDING THAT EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN
VIOLATION IS NOT ADMISSIBLE; AND PROVIDING
DEFINITIONS AND EXCEPTIONS."
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy has been addressed in a string of United States Supreme
Court cases incrementally increasing the scope of warrant-required
searching. The Court held in 1969 that warrantless searches of spaces that
do not pose a threat to an officer or are susceptible to the destruction of
evidence are unjustifiable.1 This ruling was expanded in 2009 to apply the
warrant requirement to vehicle searches.2 This string of cases culminated
in the unanimous Riley v. California3 ruling that police officers generally
cannot, without a warrant, search digital information on the cell phones
seized from the defendants as incident to the defendants' arrests.4 Chief
Justice Roberts wrote for the Court: “The answer to the question of what
police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest
is . . . simple — get a warrant.”5 This landmark decision highlighted the
ability of the Fourth Amendment to adjust to the digital age and ushered
in an era of “reasonableness balancing” to determine when a defendant’s
privacy interests are violated.6 In all, it is an impressive response to
technological development that left the door ajar for state legislatures to
expand the ruling as they see fit.7
Justice Alito concurred with the majority in Riley, but alluded to
the expansion of privacy protections beyond those specified for cell
phones in the federal system because “the nature of the electronic devices
that ordinary Americans carry on their persons [will] continue to change.”8
1

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).

2

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
134 S. Ct. 2473, 2477 (2014).
4
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 2018 (1973); Arizona, 556 U.S. at 332.
5
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495.
3

6
7
8

128 HARV. L. REV. 251 (2014).
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2497.
134 S. Ct. at 2497.

2017

LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS: HOUSE BILL 147

9

Increasing numbers of Americans have integrated Fitbits, tablets, smart
watches, computers, gaming systems, and smart TVs into their daily lives
since the 2014 Riley decision.9 Have we reached the point in the modern
world at which “we should not mechanically apply the rule used in the predigital era to the search of a cell phone?”10
In Montana, further investigation of information held on personal
electronic devices is conducted through the use of “investigative
subpoenas.”11 Montana's Constitution affords citizens broader protection
of their right to privacy than does the federal Constitution.12 In general,
infringement on privacy requires a “compelling state interest.”13 House
Bill 147 (H.R. 147) of the 65th Montana Legislative Session seeks to
heighten the privacy rights of Montanans regarding electronic devices.14
The bill is carried by third-termer Daniel Zolnikov (R) of House District
45 in Billings, whose sponsorships generally tend to promote privacy
legislation and policy.15 H.R. 147 would require search warrants for
government entities to access data on electronic devices, rather than
investigative subpoenas, on which the State currently relies.16 The bill
allows for the same judicially-recognized exceptions to warrant
requirements, and specifies exceptions for informed, affirmative consent,
voluntarily disclosed data, life-threatening situations, or emergencies.17 At
first blush, it is difficult to distinguish search warrants from investigative
subpoenas, and what they mean for Montanans who increasingly depend
on various electronic devices for safekeeping personal information.
II. WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE? PROCEDURAL DISTINCTIONS
BETWEEN WARRANTS AND INVESTIGATIVE SUBPOENAS

The common underlying balance between individual privacy
rights and the State’s compelling interest to enforce criminal laws exists
beneath both warrants and investigative subpoenas. It can be difficult to
separate their functions in practice. The Montana Supreme Court has
commented on the similarities between search warrants and investigative

9

Hearing to Require Search Warrant for Government Access to Electronic Devices, H.R. 147, 2017
Leg., 65th Sess. (Mont. 2008) (sponsorship by Daniel Zolnikov, House District 45) [hereinafter
Hearing].
10
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2496.
11
12

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2473.
Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 121 (Mont. 1997).

13

MONT. CONST. ART. II §§ 10–11.
Requiring Search Warrant for Government Access to Electronic Devices, H.R. 147, 65th Leg.
(Mont. 2017) [hereinafter H.R. 147].
15
Daniel Zolnikov, R, H.D. 45, THE 65TH MONTANA LEGISLATURE (May 14, 2014) (available at
https://perma.cc/XR8R-KRKF).
14
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H.R. 147, supra note 14.
Id.
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subpoenas in the past. In State v. Nelson,18 search warrants and
investigative subpoenas were nearly indistinguishable:
When an investigative subpoena seeks discovery
of protected medical records or information, the
subpoena can be likened to a search warrant
which must satisfy the strictures of the Fourth
Amendment and Article II, Section 11 of the
Montana Constitution. A search warrant can only
issue upon a showing of "probable cause.”19
Ultimately, investigative subpoenas and search warrants serve the
same purpose: they are tools intended to solicit and secure information that
can be used as evidence.
A warrant requires probable cause under the Fourth Amendment,
and may be applied for in criminal proceedings by peace officers, city or
county attorneys, or the attorney general.20 Probable cause requires
particularity and a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed
coupled with a reasonable belief that evidence of the crime is where the
search will occur.21 The burden of proof is on the State to prove probable
cause prior to the issuance of the warrant.22 Warrants are general
investigative tools, allowing the holder to search the entire vicinity of the
warrant-authorized area.23 There is a wide latitude of searchable space for
the investigator to explore when using a warrant. Warrants are already
required for cell phone searches.24
Unlike search warrants, investigative subpoenas are “animals of
statute,” and are not anchored in the Montana Constitution.25 Investigative
subpoenas may only be applied for by prosecutors.26 They must be issued
by a judge.27 Generally, investigative subpoenas may be issued “when it
appears upon the affidavit of the prosecutor that the administration of
justice requires it to be issued.”28 In cases regarding “constitutionally
protected material,” they require the heightened standard of a “compelling
state interest” (referenced in Montana’s Constitution), in which the

18

941 P.2d 441 at 449.
Id.
20
MONT. CONST. ART. II § 10; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-221 (2015).
21
Id.
22
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-220.
23
Gant, 556 U.S. at 332.
24
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2477.
25
Symposium: Privacy in Cyberspace [Transcripts], 61 MONT. L. REV. 43, 55 (1999) [hereinafter
Symposium]; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-301.
26
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-301.
19

27
28

Id.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-301(2).
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prosecutor must essentially demonstrate probable cause.29 Therefore, if the
subpoena concerns “constitutionally protected material,” the subpoena and
a search warrant would essentially be equivalent tools.30 Subpoenas are
used in administrative, civil and criminal settings, therefore their
applicability is much more expansive than search warrants, which are
limited to criminal proceedings.31 They can be used to solicit information
from third parties who might not necessarily be suspects in a crime that
might be useful for law enforcement.32
Given these differing procedural characteristics and the standard
of proof required, it is well-established that it is more difficult to acquire
a search warrant than an investigative subpoena.33 This means that if both
our electronic devices and our cell phones are being held by the State, the
government will have easier access to the electronic devices through the
use of a subpoena because there is currently no warrant requirement for
electronic device searches in Montana. Thus, we arrive at our next
questions: whether those electronic devices ought to be given the same
privacy protection as cell phones, that is, the protection of a search warrant
requirement, and what are the practical ramifications of heightening our
privacy?
III. ANALYSIS
Our devices have immense storage capacity to record intimate
data about our lives. Whether it’s your GPS location data, browsing
history, or you’ve just been dumped by your soulmate,34 Montanans have
an ubiquitous interest in keeping private the contents of their electronic
devices. Hearkening back to the 1969 Chimel v. California35 decision, if
there is no imminent threat of destruction of evidence or officer safety,
there is no basis for warrantless cell phone searches.36 It logically follows
that other electronic devices should be protected on the same basis – they
are not subject to evidence destruction nor are they a threat to officer safety
upon seizure. Whether this will be true in one year or twenty remains to
be seen, but there are two sides to every coin.
One concern associated with the use of search warrants is their
lack of mobility. Search warrants lose much of their authority if a

29

MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-301(3); MONT. CONST. ART. II § 10.

30

Symposium, supra note 25, at 57.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-301(2).
32
Symposium, supra note 25.
33
State v. Baldwin, 789 P.2d 1215, 1220 (Mont. 1990).
34
Madhumita Murgia, Man Uses Fitbit to Show How a Break-up Affected his Heart Rate, The
Telegraph (Jan. 20, 2016) (available at https://perma.cc/82M4-SQLU).
31

35
36

395 U.S. 752 (1969).
Id.
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defendant leaves Montana.37 A defendant’s departure requires Montana
law enforcement to cooperate with law enforcement in other states to gain
access to the device of interest.38 This could be a significant disadvantage
to the warrant requirement in the eyes of constituents who value
government accessibility to a defendant’s information. However, this
already happens for physical items; if a box, car, or backpack is
transported to another state, law enforcement face similar challenges.
Opponents of H.R. 147 also claim that search warrants are more
invasive than investigative subpoenas, because a search warrant allows the
State to access and search an entire device, while an investigative
subpoena’s request for information is limited to a specified, narrow set of
information that must be relevant or otherwise linked to the
investigation.39 Whether this is negated by the ease with which one may
acquire an investigative subpoena is up for interpretation. In addition to
these practical differences, search warrants and investigative subpoenas do
not congruently impose the burden of proof on the parties.40 Search
warrants put the burden of proof on the State to prove probable cause.41
They allow the State to gain nearly unrestricted access to property without
notice, which is advantageous for the prosecution.42 On the other hand,
investigative subpoenas generally require the defendant or suspect to
produce something with notice.43 This means they are characteristically
less invasive than search warrants, because they allow the defendant or
suspect to object to or limit the scope of the subpoena.44
H.R. 147 essentially equates cell phones to other personal
electronic devices in terms of how much privacy they are granted.45 It
would require probable cause for all electronic device searches because
the searches would be reliant on the issuance of a search warrant. Probable
cause is already required for some forms of subpoenas,46 and for those the
subpoena functions identically to a search warrant. In passing H.R. 147,
“code clutter” would arguably be reduced at the expense of changing the
burden of proof only for “administration of justice” subpoenas for
electronically stored information.47 If the bill fails, prosecutors would
benefit from a statute clarifying a more specific understanding of what
exactly constitutes “constitutionally protected material,”48 or there could

37

Hearing, supra note 9 (Testimony by Montana County Attorneys Association).
Id.
39
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-301(1); State v. Bilant, 36 P.3d 883, 889 (Mont. 2001).
40
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-301; MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-221.
41
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-221; Baldwin, 789 P.2d at 1219.
42
Baldwin, 789 P.2d at 1219.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
H.R. 147, supra note 14.
46
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-301(3).
38

47
48

MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-301(2).
Id.

2017

LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS: HOUSE BILL 147

13

be a trend of law enforcement more frequently meeting the probable cause
burden of proof so as to qualify for either a warrant or a subpoena. The
Judiciary Committee was reminded that the probable cause burden is
already mandated for cell phones, as they are subject to warrants prior to
searching.49
If electronic device searches become subject to the warrant
requirement, the government will be faced with increasingly common
warrant requests in criminal trials. Warrants are more time-consuming to
issue, and have a higher burden of proof, which would result in fewer
searches of electronic devices generally. An interesting implication for law
enforcement subject to this bill is that there would no longer be an
incentive to solicit information from third party or other non-suspect
electronic devices because subpoenas are easier to acquire than warrants.
There could be a refocus of information-gathering toward the defendant or
suspect and effort directed toward strategically securing search warrants.
More fundamentally, sources of information on personal electronic
devices would be less desirable for prosecutors because of the warrant
requirement and the State may prefer to reallocate its time and resources
toward other non-digital sources of information by using investigative
subpoenas.
An alternative to requiring probable cause and warrants for
searches of electronic devices is to simply limit the scope of the
investigative subpoena. If probable cause could be required for
investigative subpoenas that do not necessarily concern constitutionally
protected material, the goals of the legislation could be achieved without
implicating search warrants. This option could potentially be even more
advantageous to defendants or suspects because it imposes the higher
burden of proof on the State (probable cause), while at the same time
allowing the defendant or suspect the autonomy to produce the
information with notice, or object to the issuance of the subpoena before
the search occurs.50
IV. CONCLUSION
Computers and digital devices have weakened the Fourth
Amendment. Fitbits and smart TVs were not at the forefront of the minds
of the Fourth Amendment drafters, and Justice Alito seemed to anticipate
this development, forecasting that state legislatures would draw
“reasonable distinctions based on categories of information or perhaps
other variables.”51 He recognized that electronic surveillance has been
primarily governed by statute, and legislatures are in the best position to

49
50
51

Hearing, supra note 9 (Testimony by Montana County Attorneys Association).
Baldwin, 789 P.2d at 1219.
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2497.
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adapt rules relating to our changing electronic landscape.52 A unanimous
United States Supreme Court, Representative Daniel Zolnikov, and H.R.
147 opponents all seem to agree on one thing: protecting the digital
privacy rights of constituents is critical in sustaining the power of the
Fourth Amendment. The division occurs in the method by which the
privacy is protected – through search warrants or investigative subpoenas.
The State seeks easier access to electronically stored information while
defendants lean on Montana’s robust privacy protections to restrict access
to their devices. There is a precarious point at which the investigatory
interests of the State must be balanced with the privacy interests of the
defendant, and this bill treads the line between those interests.
Which would you rather have standing between the State and your
electronic devices? An investigative subpoena, or a search warrant? Phone
your legislators and let them know what you think!

52

Id.

